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 The FBI is the most recognized law enforcement entity in the world. During its 
nearly 100-year history, the Bureau has been involved in many controversies, most as a 
result of straying from its stated mission to investigate violations of federal law. This 
survey is based on personal papers of the former head of the Richmond Bureau, John 
Edward Lawler. Fortunately for historians, these files, many of which exist nowhere else 
in the agency’s archives, open a window into the operational methods and investigative 
techniques of FBI agents. An examination of John Lawler’s career provides insight into 
the conduct of field agents and Agents in Charge of field bureaus during the 1940s. 
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Introduction – History as Myth, Myth as History 
 
 “Who are you going to believe, me or your lyin’ eyes?” Groucho Marx  
 
On June 14, 1942 at 7:51 p.m., New York FBI agent Dean F. McWhorter received 
a phone call from someone wanting to speak to J. Edgar Hoover. Didn’t they all? The 
caller had arrived from Germany two days ago and he had big news, but he would not 
divulge over the phone. McWhorter took it all down and, after the caller hung up, 
followed standard procedure by filing a memorandum containing the caller’s name, Franz 
Daniel Postorius, and the message that he would call again from Washington in several 
days. Sure enough, two days later Postorius called the Washington office of the FBI, 
telling them he was now in the capital, and he wanted a meeting with Director Hoover.1 
The call was passed around starting with an Assistant Director and ending at the desk of 
Administrative Assistant to Hoover, John Edward Lawler. The caller began a confused 
litany that sounded like a confession, “[he] had half a million dollars, and… bombs,” and 
said he was staying at the Mayflower Hotel. Agent Lawler, thinking he was just “another 
nut… gone crazy,” told the man to come to his office.  Shortly thereafter, however, Agent 
Lawler reconsidered his initial opinion, and sent agents to the Mayflower to search the 
man’s room. The agents were astounded to find a suitcase full of money and bomb 
making material. Mr. Postorius eventually showed up at FBI headquarters and confessed 
to being a German spy, the leader of one group of four saboteurs who had been trained by 
                                                 
1 The FBI’s website (http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/famcases/nazi/nazi.htm) 
mentions the caller’s name as “Pastorius.” A transcript of the Military Commission 
proceedings is at: http://www.soc.umn.edu/~samaha/nazi_saboteurs/nazi16.htm. The 
transcript contains both spellings of the name. 
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German intelligence to sabotage U.S. industrial plants. Agent Lawler’s intuition had led 
to one of the most spectacular cases in the history of the FBI.2 
The story, which became known as the Nazi Saboteurs Case, was sensational. On 
June 13, 1942, under cover of darkness, a German submarine had delivered four German 
intelligence officers to a spot just off Long Island, New York. Mr. Postorius was actually 
George Dasch, the group’s leader. The men’s kit bags were filled with explosives, 
detonators, identification papers, civilian clothing, and about $175,000 in American 
currency. Before committing a single act of sabotage, however, Dasch had a fit of 
conscience, or lost his nerve, and turned himself in. He ratted out his accomplices who 
were quickly found and arrested. For the Bureau, it was a public relations bonanza, which 
they fed with carefully tailored news releases about the events.3 
There is one problem with this narrative, however; Lawler’s role in the affair was 
entirely fabricated. John Edward Lawler was not in Washington, D.C., in June 1942. He 
was at that time the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the Richmond, Virginia office. 
Lawler’s personnel file shows he was on special assignment in West Virginia starting in 
January of 1942 until he took sick leave from May 23 to May 31, at which time he “took 
numerous physical examinations to ascertain his troubles. He advised the [sic] he owned 
                                                 
2 John Edward Lawler Papers, Special Collections Archives, James Branch Cabell 
Library, Virginia Commonwealth University, Accession Number M148, Box 1 Folder 1, 
Interview Transcript, 8 February 1980, 9. Hereafter, Lawler Archive. 
3 The full account of this story is told in two books: Michael Dobbs, Saboteurs: 
The Nazi Raid on America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004); Eugene Rachlis, They 
Came to Kill: The Story of Eight Nazi Saboteurs in America (New York: Random House, 
1961). 
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his own home in Richmond and hoped the Bureau would permit him to stay [in 
Richmond]… until he could fully recover his vitality.”4  
Further, no account of the Dasch story mentions Lawler. In fact, his name is not to 
be found in the index of any source used for this survey. Agent Duane Traynor took 
Dasch’s call in the Washington office, and it was he who conducted the extensive 
debriefing of the German spy. Traynor sent agents to pick-up Dasch at the Mayflower 
Hotel, and it was only at FBI headquarters that he dumped money, quite a lot of money, 
onto the agent’s desk.  
Who was John Edward Lawler? He was an FBI agent for fifteen years. Later, he 
was a practicing lawyer, a Richmond City Councilman, a successful businessman, and a 
husband and father. He was a member of the Commonwealth Club, the exclusive, all-
male, all-white private institution reserved for the Richmond elite. He was by most 
accounts honest, dependable, and God-fearing, clearly an accomplished and respected 
man. 
As an FBI agent, he took the moral high ground on juvenile delinquency: “It’s 
your duty and my duty to do everything within our power to guide our children of today 
so they will live a law abiding and useful life.”5 As a lawyer and respected businessman, 
he wrote a newspaper editorial in which he stated, “In my opinion, the best prevention of 
juvenile crime is a belief in God and obedience to the commandments of God.”6 
                                                 
4 FOIA Request 1047552-000, 1 September 2006, Personnel File, John Edward 
Lawler.         
5 Lawler Archive, Box 2 Folder 28, Handwritten notes for “Report on Juvenile 
Delinquency.” 
6 FOIA Request 1047552-000, Personnel File, John Edward Lawler.         
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And yet, at age 74 he was found bludgeoned to death inside his home. As the 
investigation progressed, the story changed from a tragic one into a tawdry one. Sources 
told the Richmond Times-Dispatch that Lawler “liked to socialize with prostitutes…. He 
was especially fond of girls under 16 years of age.”7 Lawler had an ongoing relationship 
with one such young woman. She and her older brother were both arrested in connection 
with his murder. Three months before his death, one of Lawler’s daughters was arrested 
for prostitution, and her boyfriend for pimping her out, and for running a bawdy house.8  
Such are the contradictions and complexities of the man whose records form the 
basis of this narrative. Knowing this, perhaps it is easier to understand the unsentimental 
reflection upon human nature he made near the end of his life: “I used to always say that 
there is no man that will be able to put on a piece of paper everything he’s done and nail 
it up at Ninth and Main Streets and be able to stay in the city of Richmond twenty-four 
hours thereafter.”9  
Lawler told the story of his exploits in the Nazi Saboteurs Case in an interview.10 
It seems harmless enough. The story is for the most part true, and if an old man (he was 
72 at the time), justifiably proud of his accomplishments, adumbrates a little and inserts 
himself into one of the more exciting adventures in American history, one might regret 
the embellishment while still admiring his remarkable career. But this incident serves as a 
metaphor. In effect, the FBI and Lawler have done much the same thing in distorting, or 
                                                 
7 “Lawler Left Daughters Estate Just Before Death,” Richmond Times-Dispatch, 7 
January 1983, 1, 11. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Lawler Archive, Box 1 Folder 1, Interview Transcript, 12. 
10 Lawler told this story to an archivist as part of the process of turning over his 
papers to Cabell Library Special Collections. The interview was recorded on a cassette 
tape; the interview transcript is part of the Lawler Archive. 
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even willfully manipulating, facts in such a way as to transmogrify history. In their 
versions, Lawler and the organization he served both come out looking much better than 
historians might allow. 
 Just as Lawler inserted himself into a heroic account of smashing a Nazi spy ring, 
the FBI, over the course of its entire existence, has massaged reality to an extent that the 
Bureau has its own narrative of events that it calls history. This has been going on for so 
long, and is so pervasive, that a truly objective history of the Bureau is almost impossible 
to construct. To study the Bureau and its history is to embrace a paradox – like the tip of 
an iceberg signifies that surface appearances are deceiving, what is known of the 
Bureau’s history reveals that much is hidden, perhaps never to be fully revealed. 
The history of the FBI has been ghostwritten. From its earliest years, agency 
leadership, corrupted by patriotism, secrecy, greed for power, or some motley 
combination thereof, constructed chapter and verse outlines of this spurious story. The 
tone was defensive, artless, dogmatic and heavy-handed. Media propagandists hired to 
sex up the story provided the art; in the process, they juiced the details, distorted facts, 
and packaged the FBI like any commodity. In short, they wrote fiction, historical fiction 
perhaps, but fiction nonetheless. The American public, including Congress and 
Presidents, provided the last crucial ingredient – suspension of disbelief on a societal 
scale. The public, at least, had an excuse - they were deliberately deceived by the Bureau. 
Congress and Presidents cannot make such an exculpatory claim. Nonetheless, the public 
was not paying attention, and it helped to feed the myth, vagabonding its way through the 
twentieth century like a freewheeling hobo. 
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In this respect, though believing it suffers from periodic infections, the FBI’s flaw 
is genetic. At its best, the Bureau was (and still is) a very effective and formidable 
investigative agency. But it became an intelligence apparatus as well, a compromise that 
played to its weaknesses, while diminishing its strengths. Throughout its history it has 
suffered periodic bouts of incompetence and complacency; it has suffered from poor 
leadership, a hidebound bureaucracy, and a fatal lack of imagination. The Bureau 
developed a selective memory, carefully cultivating an idealized version of its history 
that is dangerously inaccurate. It has lied to itself about who it is, what it has done, and 
why it has done what it has done. This then became the ‘history’ of the Bureau, a history 
perpetuated even today. There is even a Bureau historian to legitimize the myth. In a 
telephone interview, Dr. John Fox made some remarkable assertions about the agency, its 
history, J. Edgar Hoover, and the objectivity of independent historians who have studied 
and written about the FBI.11  
The debit column in the history of the FBI has two main entries: abuse of its 
power, and failure of its duty. The former resulted from a lack of congressional and 
presidential oversight, an intractable conservative ideology, and a dedication to secrecy 
for its own sake. This account will only briefly address oversight, as the focus is more on 
the Bureau’s self-identity, and self-regulation or lack thereof. The latter issue is a little 
trickier, for all large bureaucracies move at their own speed.  
Witness historian Athan Theoharis, who has spent nearly thirty years researching 
and writing about the Bureau. In his most recent book, he reaches the following 
                                                 
11 Telephone interview with Dr. John Fox, FBI historian, 24 April 2006. 
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conclusion: “A comprehensive history of the FBI cannot be written.”12 There is much 
bitter experience behind this assessment. Using the Church Committee reports and the 
updated Freedom of Information Act (generally known as FOIA) laws in the late 1970s, 
Theoharis did pioneering work on the issue of wiretapping and presidential authority, and 
has been at it hammer and tongs ever since.  
Bureau historian John Fox thinks Theoharis employs a “radical libertarian critique 
of the Bureau,” that he “has looked at the material too narrowly, has taken a narrow 
selection of documents” in order to make his case.13 This critique is disingenuous, for 
only someone with nearly unlimited access to the Bureau’s historical files could support 
this claim. It is simply too difficult and too expensive for an independent researcher, even 
one as experienced as Theoharis, to obtain documents from the Bureau for this claim to 
be meritorious.  
This is the most formidable obstacle to those who would study the FBI - agency 
secrecy. This secrecy is to some extent sanctioned by law. It was only in the 1970s that 
the FBI released files, under pressure of course, to the National Archives. The incendiary 
Church Committee Reports (the first in 1974) pried secrets from Hoover’s cold dead 
hands. It forced amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, which allowed 
researchers to submit requests for Bureau files. Today, FBI files from any year after 1922 
are unavailable to the public, and can be obtained only by filing a FOIA request.14 Even 
                                                 
12 Athan Theoharis, The FBI and American Democracy: A Brief Critical History 
(Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 180. 
13 Telephone interview with Dr. John Fox, 24 April 2006. 
14 The Bureau does make available to the public certain files, such as the Famous 
Cases Archive on their website in the Electronic Reading Room. These are accounts of 
sensational cases, which show the Bureau in a positive light. They are also highly 
selective accounts. In short, they are propaganda. See 
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so, the Bureau’s filing system is Byzantine in its complexity, and the Records Division, 
in charge of fielding FOIA requests, only stultifies attempts to pierce the armor of 
secrecy.  
This is merely to demonstrate that a ‘history’ of the FBI does not tell the whole 
story. Too many files have been destroyed; too many files are arbitrarily withheld. And, 
in February 2006, it was reported that previously declassified Department of Justice files 
are being reviewed in secret by Department henchmen for reclassification. The newly 
reclassified (undeclassified?) files were physically removed from the National Archives, 
no longer accessible to researchers.15 
 Strangely enough, there is some precedent for this retroactive whiting out of the 
record. The master sanitizer, J. Edgar Hoover, literally altered history when he sent a 
team of five agents armed with scissors and razor blades to the National Archives to 
excise derogatory passages about himself and the FBI from the newly released diaries of 
FDR’s Treasury Secretary, Henry Morganthau. It took several weeks of cutting, 
renumbering, and reassemblage. Librarians at the Roosevelt Presidential Library found 
that FBI reports previously present among FDR’s papers were missing. Comparisons 
between reports extant in the Roosevelt Library against copies of the same reports 
obtained elsewhere clearly show either alterations to files, in that documents were edited 
and retyped, or that entire sections of the report had been removed. Library of Congress 
archives were also ransacked. Shortly after Felix Frankfurter, whom Hoover loathed, 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/famcases/nazi/nazi.htm. There is no mention of 
Dasch’s confession. 
15 “Declassification in Reverse,” at 
www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB179/ 
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turned his diaries over to the library sections from them were stolen. Notable by its 
absence was a speech by Frankfurter that roundly criticized the Bureau and its Director.16  
Richard Gid Powers has spent his professional career studying and writing about 
the Bureau. He is, arguably, the preeminent chronicler of the past and present history of 
the FBI. Powers’ most recent book is a distillation of his career’s work. It begins with this 
melancholic reflection, “This is the history of an American tragedy. The story of how as 
great an American institution as the FBI could become so traumatized by its past that it 
failed its duty to the nation it was sworn to protect.”17  
My contention is that the Bureau wasn’t traumatized by its past because it 
continuously misrepresented it, to such an extent that this willful selection of facts 
became history, the agency’s authorized version. The trauma, when it occurred at all, 
came when the Bureau’s illegal operations were exposed to public scrutiny. The trauma 
was that of a man caught in flagrante, a man who could no longer deny his guilt with a 
straight face. 
There was no one better at this sort of duplicity than J. Edgar Hoover. From 1924 
to 1972, he was the paranoid brain and blackened heart of the agency. History has not 
been kind to Hoover; the evidence is simply too damning. That is, what evidence is 
extant, and of that, what is made available. After his death, Helen Gandy, Hoover’s 
trusted and loyal secretary, testified that she spent two and a half months destroying his 
                                                 
16Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and His Secrets (New York: W.W. 
Norton and Company, 1991), 389-90. 
17 Richard Gid Powers, Broken: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the 
FBI (New York: The Free Press, 2004), 1. 
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secret file stash, at least six file cabinets worth, consisting of those documents deemed 
too sensitive to place in the agency’s main system.18  
Not much is known about Hoover’s private life. It is generally accepted that he 
lived for his work. Most biographers have gone about finding the man by examining the 
agency. The results have been uneven. Anthony Summers’ biography is essentially a 
whisper campaign.19 Richard Powers worked to place Hoover into the context of the 
times. He argued that, despite his many flaws, Hoover was a consummate professional.20 
Curt Gentry’s journalistic account painted a persuasive and damning portrait of Hoover 
and his twisted ego, but he doesn’t much bother with placing him into an historical 
context.21 Theoharis, who knows the documentary evidence better than anyone, 
examined Hoover within a political context. He argued that Presidents, Congress, 
journalists, and the American public were complicit in allowing Hoover to remain in 
power.
ldn’t, 
                                                
22  
None of these biographies is entirely satisfying, none entirely convincing. To this 
day Hoover remains an enigma, but there is this much consensus: he didn’t, or cou
change with the times. He became an anachronism, but, like a revolver in a semi-
automatic world, he was always potentially dangerous. When the full catalogue of FBI 
abuses perpetrated on Hoover’s watch became known it was as long and as bewildering 
 
18 Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and His Secrets, 729. 
19 See Anthony Summers, Official and Confidential: The Secret Life of J. Edgar 
Hoover (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1993). 
20 See Richard Gid Powers, Secrecy and Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover 
(New York: The Free Press, 1987). 
21 Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and His Secrets. 
22 See John Stuart Cox and Athan, Theoharis, The Boss: J. Edgar Hoover and the 
Great American Inquisition (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988); Athan 
Theoharis, Editor, From the Secret Files of J. Edgar Hoover (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 
1991). 
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as a Chinese restaurant menu. He remained (or was allowed to remain) too long in po
After his death the agency suffered the plague of his legacy, making agent’s already 
difficult jobs much more difficult. The following assessm
wer. 
ent is apt, “J. Edgar Hoover… 
was ou
t 
 
ng 
essors] have yet to incorporate his abuses into their basic 
courses
re 
ACs 
nd his 
at were 
                                                
r most enduring national scandal.”23 
Another, and perhaps the more important, consensus among historians is abou
what remains to be done. As Theoharis stated, “The story of [the FBI’s] institutional 
politics remains to be told.”24 Another scholar echoed this theme, wondering about “the
massive and unquestioning support he received from thousands of FBI agents…. Why 
they did not blow the whistle on him is a subject worthy of analysis…. More interesti
still is why… [college prof
 and textbooks.”25 
During his tenure, Hoover and his memory, his twisted version of ‘history,’ 
defined the Bureau. Not all agents bought it, of course, but through careful screening and 
the selective winnowing of freethinkers, the Bureau was able to harness enough agents to 
the wheel to push the myth forward. One agent stated plainly that under Hoover a cultu
of corrupt compromise “became part of our thinking, part of our personality.”26 S
and field agents, the blood and guts of the operation, fed and groomed the FBI’s 
institutional mythos. Many believed in Hoover and wholly supported his ideology a
methods. Other agents kept faith for reasons of their own, acting in ways th
 
23 Michael Wreszin, “Gee But I’d Like To Be a G-Man,” Reviews in American 
History, Vol. 20, No. 2 (June, 1992), 258. 
24 Athan Theoharis, J. Edgar Hoover, Sex and Crime: An Historical Antidote 
(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1995), 20. 
25 Christopher Pyle, Untitled Review, Political Science Quarterly Vol. 107, No. 2, 
(Summer 1992), 368. 
26 Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and His Secrets, 280. 
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consist
ia. 
ilable evidence will clearly 
ow disparities between history and the propagated myth. 
                                                
ent with the mythology, but that were contrary to the Constitution.  
Such a man was John Edward Lawler. In 1982, he left his papers to the Cabell 
Library at Virginia Commonwealth University in his hometown of Richmond, Virgin
He culled the collection before he turned it over. Even so, what remains is a trove of 
unredacted primary source material, much of which is not available anywhere else.27 
Subjecting the Bureau’s autobiography to the burden of ava
sh
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 My FOIA requests for certain documents found in the Lawler Archive came 
back with the dread “No files were found” tag. Whole reports in the Lawler archive are 
found nowhere else in the FBI’s files, if the Records Management Division is to be 
believed. 
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Early History 
ent was 
 it 
that the movement gained enough momentum to 
make s
. 
ption, 
ause 
government, had the power to bring 
crimina
n is 
 
                                                
 
The Constitution provided for no agency to enforce federal laws. States rights 
were clearly protected from federal interference, and, as federal laws were matters of 
national interest and had little applicability to everyday crimes, law enforcem
necessarily a local and state responsibility. Soon though, particularly during 
Reconstruction, the need for a federal enforcement arm became glaringly apparent. But
wasn’t until the early Progressive era 
uch a force a real possibility.  
As part of his Progressive ideal for societal reform and a more activist federal 
government, Teddy Roosevelt proposed the creation of a new federal detective agency
Congress loudly decried the wisdom and legality of establishing such a force, citing a 
usurpation of power by the executive branch. The heat generated by this controversy was 
unsurprising as one of the main tasks of the new force would be to investigate corru
the taint of which adhered to many in Congress. Richard Powers maintains that the 
agency “was born out of the progressive struggle to end corruption in government and 
bring to justice malefactors of wealth…. Teddy Roosevelt founded the Bureau bec
the federal government, and only the federal 
ls of power and wealth to justice.”28 
The generally accepted date for the establishment of the Bureau of Investigatio
1908. The new federal agency’s first nationwide law enforcement responsibility was
 
28 Powers, Broken, 61. 
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under the Mann Act. It was 1910 and the Bureau did not yet have its sea legs. Most 
historians now see the Mann Act as social moralism gone awry.29 The legislation was 
drafted, hazily, lazily, to combat the so-called White Slave Traffic, or commercialize
vice. Bureau Chief Stanley W. Finch cynically exploited societal fears of corrupted 
womanhood to shake down Congress for appropriations. He testified, “Unless a girl wa
actually confined in a room and guarded, there was no girl, regardless of her station in
life, who was altogether safe…. There was a need that every person be on his guard, 
because no one could tell when his daughter or his wife or his mother would be selected 
as a victim.”
d 
s 
 
blem of vice in modern civilization” the main business of the Bureau before the 
ar.31 
telligence 
e 
he Church 
e, paved as it may 
have be
                                                
30 J. Edgar Hoover would later say, without irony, that the Mann Act made 
“the pro
w
 The defense of feminine virtue served to establish the Bureau in the in
gathering business. This would become the elephant’s skeleton in the closet. 
Occasionally down through the subsequent decades, the public would get a glimpse of th
depth and breadth of the Bureau’s intelligence apparatus, but it wasn’t until t
Committee reports of the 1970s that the issue would explode into the public 
consciousness. The long winding road from investigation to intelligenc
en with good intentions, began with Mann Act investigations. 
 
29 The Mann Act is still a federal statute. It surfaced most recently in March 2008 
as part of the prostitution scandal and the subsequent investigation of New York 
Governor, Eliot Spitzer. http://www.alternet.org/sex/80159/.  
30Max Lowenthal, The Federal Bureau of Investigation (Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 1950), 15.  
31Fred J Cook, The FBI Nobody Knows (New York: Macmillan Company, 1964), 
58. 
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But from 1910 through 1917, the height of Mann Act enforcement, the devil had 
not yet drafted the Faustian bargain that would later cause scandal for the Bureau. He 
was, however, sharpening his pencils. Bureau field offices were set-up in cities across the
country, and agents, finding themselves in unfamiliar territory, looked to the local police 
for information and guidance. The locals knew exactly where to take their virgin friends
– to the brothels. The local madams and their girls were interviewed, or subtly threatened
into providing information for what would become surveys of local vice. This could be 
slightly awkward at times, as local power brokers, leading businessmen, and policemen 
on the take were sometimes implicated in moral turpitude and other unsavory activities.
But it was a windfall for the Bureau. Agents learned the ace-in-the-hole value of sensit
 
 
, 
 
ive 
persona
r 
d a 
reau needed only a new mission to utilize these 
new po  
y 
 these procedures were pioneered by FBI agents in the 1910s 
l information squirreled away in Bureau files, the importance of good relations 
with the local police and informants, and the limits of their own, and Bureau, power.  
The legacies of Mann Act investigations were the Bureau’s preoccupation with 
private morality at the expense of criminal investigations, the establishment of a dossie
system on individuals that included personal information of a very sensitive nature, an
greatly expanded bureaucracy. The Bu
wers and responsibilities. It would soon enough find it had all it could handle
when the world went to war in 1914.  
The conduct of the FBI during these years, roughly 1914 to 1924, would set 
precedents that were hard to shake. When the Bureau was mired in scandal some fifty 
years later, those who knew the history of the Bureau could see in the excesses of the da
shadows from this earlier era. Illegal detentions, warrantless searches, break-ins, bugs, 
taps, opening of mail – all
 16
and ear
Cs who perpetrated the 
excesse , it 
 in 
 constitutional rights. Like every 
season  to 
historia
 
e 
rivalry, all of which were encouraged by the constitutional division between state 
and federal powers and by a native preference for private enterprise. As late as 
two army intelligence officers and no professional counterespionage agency.  
e agencies jockeying to take charge 
                                                
ly 1920s. There were refinements made over the years, many made possible by 
advances in technology.  
Field agents and SACs were slowly poisoned with the belief that this was all in 
the service of a greater good, but their personal justifications for conducting illegal 
operations became increasingly abstract and difficult to justify. Bit by bit, the devil had 
his way, and the pact was signed. It was these very agents and SA
s, who carried out orders they knew to be extra-constitutional. As we shall see
is agents like John Lawler that history must render verdict upon. 
World War I presented formidable challenges to the institutions of American 
democracy, a challenge that resonates in 2008 with the same intense clarity that it did
1917 – how to ensure national security while protecting
that leads to war, it was a complicated historical moment. And, according
n David B. Davis, America was not prepared:  
Historically there has been little need to organize a professional corps of 
counterespionage agents to keep track of spies or to counteract foreign efforts to
mobilize domestic dissidents. Consequently the history of American intelligenc
operations has been marked by decentralization, amateurism, and jurisdictional 
1917 on the eve of America’s entry into World War I, the nation had precisely 
32
 
With new field offices in most large cities the Bureau was in an enviable position 
among the gaggle of government and private detectiv
 
32 Richard Blum, Editor, Surveillance and Espionage in a Free Society: A Report 
by the Planning Group on Intelligence and Security to the Policy Council of the 
Democratic National Committee (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), 13. 
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of spy c
ed 
 in full 
 
munists, dragnet raids, and surveillance 
based o
l 
successive Republican administrations unleashed corporate 
Americ
de 
atching. The Bureau’s experience on the home front in World War I would be, in 
many ways, a formative experience for the agency.  
There was a logic and a momentum to agency activities. Much of what concern
the Bureau was dictated by events outside its control, but it sinned, and it sinned
view of the church. Mann Act investigations bled into spying on labor unions and the 
formation of an extensive archive on radicals, Communists, and others deemed 
subversive, for the agency assumed “that immorality is a handmaiden of radicalism.”33
From there it was a short step to spying on Com
n political affiliations. In short, “Because it [was] so efficient, surveillance… 
transformed itself from a means into an end.”34 
All these tactics, and more, were used by the Bureau in the infamous Slacker 
Raids, the Palmer Raids, and in their investigations into the Teapot Dome Scandal. By 
1924, the Bureau was reeling due to internal corruption and public outrage over the 
excesses committed in these events. The remainder of the decade was a blur of scanda
and partisanship. Three 
a to feed at the trough of capitalist profiteering, unhindered by accountability, 
oversight, or restraint.  
Then head of the Alien Enemy Bureau, J. Edgar Hoover, sharpening the axe of 
communism against the stone of national security, broadened his investigations to inclu
“the studying of matters of an international nature, as well as economic and industrial 
                                                 
33 Frank J Donner, The Age of Surveillance: The Aims and Methods of America’s 
Political Intelligence System (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), 16. 
34 Ibid., 7. 
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disturbances incident thereto.”35 The Bureau infiltrated labor unions, workers groups, 
radical groups, and any other organization thought to be affiliated with Communists. 
Filing cabinets bulged with information never to be used for prosecutions of crime. This 
informa s, 
 
 unsavory doings, and due to the untimely death of 
Preside
 
 
membe
  
tion was, however, shared with business interests who used it to thwart strike
union organizing, work stoppages, and other worker actions.36 
Despite his intimate involvement in the Slacker Raids, the Palmer Raid, the
Teapot Dome Scandal, and other
nt Coolidge’s appointed Director, J. Edgar Hoover was chosen to head the 
Bureau. It was a fateful choice.  
When he took over in 1924, Hoover was hardly unknown. At the time, he seemed
an unlikely, if not unpopular, choice to head the Bureau. His career began humbly 
enough. Shortly after the US entered the First World War, the Justice Department hired 
the former Library of Congress cataloguer and card index maven as a clerk. Based on 
these administrative and organizational skills, he was later assigned to the Alien Enemy 
Bureau, where “He… gained experience processing aliens, determining who should be 
interned, who turned over to the Immigration Bureau for deportation, and who should be
freed. The grounds for holding or deporting aliens tended to be political, based on their 
rship in anarchist or other antiwar groups. By the end of the war Hoover had an 
expertise on radical aliens that was probably unmatched in the Justice Department.”37
                                                 
35 Athan Theoharis, editor, “A Brief History of the FBI,” in The FBI: A 
Comprehensive Reference Guide (Phoenix, Oryx Press, 1999), 10. 
36 For the most recent scholarship on the Red Scare see: Regin Schmidt, Red 
Scare: FBI and the Origins of Anticommunism in the United States, 1919-1943 
(Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2000). 
37 Powers, Broken, 109. 
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 The previous sentence may or may not be true. If it is true, it is not saying mu
Whatever expertise on radicals and communists there was in the Justice Department 
should not be confused with an objective knowledge based on historical research 
divorced from ideology. 
ch. 
One Bureau agent, whose job it was to know such things, 
testified
e have 
s history. 
tely needed reforms and 
for the 
e 
t a clandestine empire that 
threaten law. 
ot a secret to 
                                                
 before a congressional committee, “German socialism… is the father of the 
Bolsheviki movement in Russia, and consequently the radical movement which w
in this country today has its origin in Germany.”38 Apparently, all revolutions had the 
same Teutonic mother.  
By the time the Depression hit, the Bureau was in a curious position in it
It had weathered the Red Scare, the scandals of the 1920s, and retrenchment and 
reorganization. Hoover had survived it all. He oversaw despera
most part kept a low profile. He had made his reputation first as an anti-radical 
foot soldier of capitalism, but he later morphed into other roles, such as an anti-
Communist ideologue, a Cerberus of secret files, the captain of a federalized surveillanc
network, and finally in the mid-1930s, as the peerless G-man.  
One curious omission from Hoover’s curriculum vitae was scourge of organized 
crime. During Prohibition, criminal rackets had over time accomplished what the bane of 
western civilization, Communism, could not – they had buil
ed the founding institutions of American democracy, particularly the rule of 
These criminal gangs were the worst kept secret in the country. They were n
the FBI either, but for ideological reasons Hoover maintained (and continued to insist for 
thirty years afterwards) that organized crime did not exist.  
 
38 Lowenthal, The Federal Bureau of Investigation, 49. 
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While G-men picked off desperadoes such as John Dillinger and Baby Face 
Nelson one by one, crime bosses and racketeers constructed a sophisticated 
interconnected alliance of moonshiners, bootleggers, distributors, policemen, politici
and so on – a paradigm of the vertical integration business model. These syndicates wer
rolling in cash. The corrosive effects of these absurdly well-fund
ans, 
e 
ed enterprises ate away 
at the f
e. It 
reau 
lt 
olutionary political philosophy. The FBI spent an enormous amount 
of time and wasted vast resources on surveillance, tapping, bugging, and otherwise 
investigating Communists, or those who were sympathetic to Communism as a political 
eology. Sympathy for the cause, fellow traveling, was enough to damn anyone in the 
yes of the Bureau. 
 
 
oundations of American society. While Hoover fiddled, crime burned through the 
major cities. Straight, with no-irony chaser, he denied there was a conspiracy called 
organized crime; he was too busy ghosting after communists, spying on his critics, and 
propagandizing his pyrrhic victories over immorality and vice. 
Simply put, the Bureau had an abiding interest in not tackling organized crim
chose its battles based on the chances for a successful investigation, and the publicity 
resulting therefrom. This publicity could then be leveraged to obtain increased funding, 
and glory for the agency and its director. Communism was a different story. The Bu
was blinded by ideology; it never understood Communism, or Communists. It did, 
however, fully comprehend and exploit the confusion and insecurity many Americans fe
about the party’s rev
id
e
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The Making of an Agent 
 
In the history of the FBI, the year 1935 is of no burning significance. The bad 
news w t 
r 
ation became the Federal Bureau of 
Investig
single, 
 
facility, he and his fellow recruits got a crash course in the nuts and bolts of police work. 
                                                
as that the country was in the midst of the Depression. The good news was tha
the Eighteenth Amendment had been repealed two years earlier – Prohibition was ove
and not a moment too soon for the many employed only in the unskilled labor of killing 
time.  
It was in 1935 that the Bureau of Investig
ation, an upgrade meant to reflect the burgeoning, some would say intrusive, 
federal presence in American society. Also, in July of that year, the FBI inducted a new 
agent, John Edward Lawler, the standard government-issue G-man: young, white, 
conservative Southern male with a law degree.  
Lawler was born in 1908 in Mobile, Alabama, son of parents prosperous enough 
to send him to a Jesuit boarding school. He graduated from Spring Hill College in Mobile 
in 1930, and from Georgetown University of Law in 1935, passing the District of 
Columbia bar that same year, and the Virginia bar the year following.39 
Lawler entered FBI school on July 1, 1935.40 At the Quantico, Virginia, training
 
39 J.E. Lawler, “The Schwarzschild Bros. Jewel Robbery Case,” Virginia Trooper, 
October 1953, 2-11; and Lawler Archives, Interview Transcript, Box 1 Folder 1, 1. 
40 FOIA Request 1047552-000, Personnel File, John Edward Lawler. 
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Training lasted for three months and was highly regimented. It included “firearms 
training; jurisdiction of FBI; mechanics and techniques of surveillance, arrest, search and 
seizure; federal procedure, investigation methods, crime scene search, scientific crim
detection, crime research, and practical case work.”
e 
followed by field training 
in Was
re 
dical 
gh not 
uals, 
Negroe
ts 
                                                
41 This was 
hington, D.C., and a short stint at Bureau headquarters, or the Seat of Government 
(SOG). Seat of Government was not an ironic moniker bestowed by wiseacre field 
agents, but the official designation used by Bureau leadership. 
The most important training of new recruits was a forced march into the realm of 
Bureau fabulism. At Quantico, Lawler and other agents-in-training were force-fed a diet 
of purified ideology, unleavened conformity, low dogma, and high principle. There we
typically fifty men per candidate class, but “no blacks, no Jews, or Hispanics… this was 
Hoover’s policy.”42 Out of the gate, candidates were “heavily indoctrinated with ra
right-wing propaganda.”43 Individuality, a sense of humor, irony, drinking, baldness, 
pinheadedness, bad skin, poor hygiene, and irreverence were strict liabilities, thou
all were mentioned in the manual. Each class contained two or three snitches who 
monitored and reported upon apostasy in the ranks. The Supreme Court, homosex
s, labor unions, the NAACP, the ACLU, reporters, Communists, radicals, 
syndicalists, politicians of a certain faith – these, and others considered by Hoover to be 
dangerously liberal, were repeatedly disparaged during the three month training. 
Before becoming an agent, Lawler had shown disturbing signs of liberalism. 
While working toward his law degree, he clerked at a grocery store at 16th and R stree
 
41 Lawler Archives, Box 1, Tour Manual, page 10.  
42 William C. Sullivan, The Bureau: My Thirty Years in Hoover’s FBI (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 1979), 16. 
43 Cook, The FBI Nobody Knows, 3. 
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in Washington, DC. From there, he watched General Douglas MacArthur march on the
Bonus Army veterans bivouacked nearby. Like many at the time, Lawler believed the 
scale of suffering during the Depressio
 
n had a humanizing effect, “In those days and 
times, w
cere, 
ad 
e 
45 
views 
e reveal “that he was very thorough particularly in answering 
questio
 
its 
t 
necessarily in that order. One former agent remembered, “The Manual of Rules and 
                                                
e were all on the march. We were all in the same boat. Nobody had anything. 
Everybody was in sympathy of somebody getting something.”44 He sounded sin
empathetic and damn-near socialistic. 
Instructors at Quantico were chosen more for the purity of their faith than their 
expertise in police matters. Most instructors had had long tenures at the Seat of 
Government, where Hoover could more closely watch over his errant flock. They h
been long divorced from the particular demands of fieldwork; they were pencil squeezers, 
yes men, true believers. What they successfully imparted to their charges was th
importance of “discipline, uniformity of appearance, and paperwork perfection.”
Fortunately, Lawler excelled at each of these, and later lectured at the academy. Re
of his performanc
ns… but [he] gave a somewhat colorless presentation… and some of his 
mannerisms while talking detracted to a great extent from the effectiveness of his 
presentation.”46  
Agent memoirs are chock-a-block with the vagaries and recriminations of the
training regime, wherein small errors yielded gross punishments. The heathen recru
were steeped in the golden rule – Do nothing to embarrass the Bureau or the Director, no
 
44 Lawler Archives, Interview Transcript, Box 1 Folder 1, 1. 
45 David Marston and Neil J. Welch, Inside Hoover’s FBI: The Top Field Chief 
Reports (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1984), 40. 
46 FOIA Request 1047552-000, Personnel File, John Edward Lawler. 
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Regulations was the Old Testament for the Bureau, laying down rules of persona
conduct that were as punitive and unforgiving as the ancient la
l 
ws of the Hebrews. This 
manual
 not 
 
structors - who was the pinhead? Finally, after 
several f 
ell address, telling his new recruits, “Go out and 
I know  
 
 
good judgment… was well equipped with a knowledge of the Bureau’s policies and 
regulations, and his chances for advancement along administrative lines were somewhat 
                                                
 contained the revealed word of the Director and catalogued most of the 
[transgressions] that could be committed by an FBI agent.”47  
Successfully completing the training course did not guarantee graduates a career 
in the FBI. The whims of the Director were legendary, and arbitrary dismissals were
uncommon. Hoover attended agent graduations, which always sent trepidation rippling
through the ranks, recruits and instructors alike. After one such ceremony, Hoover 
announced before his departure that one of the graduates, a “pinhead,” was to be fired 
immediately. A crisis ensued among the in
 days, the Bureau’s resident genius thought to check hat sizes; the “pinhead,” he o
the smallest head, was found and fired.48 
Lawler remembers his graduation from Quantico as the first time he laid eyes on 
the Director. Hoover presented the farew
 you are gonna have fun and enjoy yourself, but don’t get caught.”49 For Lawler,
these were words to make a career by. 
Before sending them into the cold, cruel world, the Bureau evaluated its virgin 
agents. Lawler was rated as “about average as to coordination of mind and muscle, he
was small of stature… was amenable to discipline, was possessed by good assurance and
 
47 Joseph L. Schott, No Left Turns (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1975), 45. 
48 Ibid.  
49 Lawler Archive, Interview Transcript, Box 1 Folder 1, 5. 
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hampered because of his small stature but it was believed he had above average general 
mental qualifications.”50  
This obsession with Lawler’s “small stature” is both fascinating and perplexing. 
Nearly every Bureau fitness report written throughout his career mentions it. His 
personnel file lists him as five feet eight inches tall, and one hundred and thirty pounds.51 
For the FBI, shortness was a liability that prohibited advancement; that Lawler eventually 
rose as high as he did, no pun intended, was testament to hard work, adherence to the 
company line, and sycophancy.  
An agent’s first three to five years were a probationary period of sorts, as he 
transferred yearly to new cities and assignments to gain experience.52 Agents saw this as 
another form of control, a tacit acknowledgement that they served at the whim of the 
Director. It prevented agents from forming alliances, a threat in Hoover’s eyes, and kept 
them in a state of agitated insecurity.  
There were no guarantees of job security, even for veteran agents who had served 
admirably for many years. Hoover once transferred twenty-five SACs at the same time, 
for no discernable reason.53 Lawler would encounter this later in his career. While 
serving as SAC in Richmond, he was suddenly “placed on special assignment… [in] 
West Virginia. As a result of his health and the condition of his wife who was recovering 
from giving birth to a child he requested to be relieved of this special assignment…. He 
was advised that his wishes could not be conceded with.”54 The previous sentence is the 
                                                 
50 FOIA Request 1047552-000, Personnel File, John Edward Lawler. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Sullivan, The Bureau, 23-4. 
53 Marston and Welch, Inside Hoover’s FBI, 5. 
54 FOIA Request 1047552-000, Personnel File, John Edward Lawler. 
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very quintessence of FBI policy under Hoover. Bureau leadership considered an agent’s 
concern for the health of himself, his wife, and his new baby as a concession, which 
needed to be resisted.  
As for investigations and police work, these arbitrary transfers were 
counterproductive. Agents weren’t able to develop a lasting rapport with potential 
sources or informers. Logistically, agents had to learn quickly how to navigate in an 
unfamiliar environment. It served Hoover’s paranoia, but did little for morale, efficiency, 
and the stated mission of the Bureau: investigations. In short, everyone not at SOG was a 
potential threat, “FBI cases were made in the field, which made field agents 
indispensable. That in turn meant… that the field was the ultimate threat to the 
Director.”55 
For a family man, a yearly move was almost an invitation to divorce-court, 
although, as agents would have joked had a sense of humor not been systemically ground 
out of them, divorce was strictly against Bureau policy. Lawler, a bachelor, started his 
career in Buffalo in October 1935, chasing down federal fugitives between snowstorms. 
The pay was $3200 per annum. He received high marks from the Buffalo Special Agent 
in Charge, who commended him for a “neat appearance… a good personality… an 
excellent knowledge of the Bureau’s work,” and for being “a good worker… it was 
believed he possessed latent administrative ability which would be brought out with 
further experience, his reports were thorough and dictated well.”56 
In keeping with the policy of yearly transfers for junior agents, Lawler left wintry 
Buffalo for sunny Los Angeles in April 1936. The L.A. bureau advised headquarters that 
                                                 
55 Marston and Welch, Inside Hoover’s FBI,, 4. 
56 FOIA Request 1047552-000, Personnel File, John Edward Lawler. 
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Agent Lawler was thorough, had good judgment and sound knowledge of his duties. 
Mention was again made of his height, “While small in stature he inspired confidence in 
all types of persons, although he might not make a good first impression.” Again, he was 
thought to have “latent administrative ability.”57    
In January 1937, he moved to Washington, where he sat in the Investigative 
Division tracking down stolen automobiles. During his stay in Washington from 1937 to 
August 1939, he received additional training at Kidnap Squad School, where he sat on the 
major case desk, and then he received field training in intelligence operations. His 
supervisors remarked that he had “certain definite qualities of leadership and ability to 
command others,” and it was thought that, given time and the proper encouragement, he 
might someday make a “satisfactory Special Agent in Charge.” But his height and 
appearance were a problem, “He possessed considerable ability which was somewhat 
obscured by his rather boyish and immature appearance and this appearance handicapped 
him.”58  
 Despite these shortcomings, Lawler possessed two specific qualities that ensured 
him success within the FBI bureaucracy – his administrative abilities, and his loyalty. 
Fitness reports repeatedly mention “his ability in the supervisory, administrative and 
executive field.”59 He was a good bureaucrat, so good that, according to his version of 
events, he was assigned as Administrative Assistant to Director Hoover. 
                                                 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
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 The chronology here gets a little murky. Here is what is known: in August 1939 
he became SAC in Richmond;60 one year later, he transferred to Washington; after only 
two months, he received orders to report to the New York office. Lawler then tendered 
his resignation, citing health concerns. It took only two days, however, until he thought 
better of this decision and withdrew his resignation. At this point, “The Director 
instructed him to take sufficient time away from work to thoroughly regain his former 
good health.” 61 It’s not clear whether Lawler resigned to forestall his transfer or if his 
health concerns were critical. In any event, his appointment to the New York office was 
cancelled, and he returned to Richmond. 
I could find no confirmation for Lawler’s claim to be Administrative Assistant to 
Hoover in his personnel file.  In fairness, the document is vague in some areas. The file 
states only that he was transferred to “the Administrative Division at the Seat of 
Government.”62 There is no mention of his being specifically assigned to the Director. 
This may be another of Lawler’s embellishments, a form of verbal aggrandizement, in 
that, technically, all employees of the Administrative Division were ‘Assistants’ to 
Hoover. The personnel file is unclear on this point.  
Whatever the case, Lawler thought himself excellently qualified to be an 
Administrative Assistant, a position he described as being “sort of a desk sergeant.”63 He 
claimed that his working relationship with Hoover was positive, “I knew what he wanted, 
what type of memorandum, the type of information he wanted, knew how to present it to 
                                                 
60 This is confirmed by the Times-Dispatch: “New FBI Agent Arrives in City,” 
Richmond Times-Dispatch, 30 August 1939, 6. 
61 FOIA Request 1047552-000, Personnel File, John Edward Lawler. 
62 FOIA Request 1047552-000, Personnel File, John Edward Lawler. 
63 Lawler Archive, Interview Transcript, Box 1 Folder 1, 5. 
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him, and in that way I traveled with him on all the major cases that he undertook to be 
at.”64  
Memoranda indisputably authored by Lawler show that he came to master the 
flat, dull, workmanlike prose so beloved by law enforcement organizations nationwide. 
That must have suited the Director just fine. For his part, Lawler greatly admired and 
respected his boss. Thirty years later, Lawler still thought Hoover “a great man. He was 
great leader [sic].”65  
Hoover was fanatical about paperwork. Lawler remembered him, in some 
understatement, as “a man who was very attentive to details. He had a knack of writing 
his criticisms on memorandums, little short statements. One of them I will never forget. 
He said, ‘This memorandum burns me up but leaves me cold.’”66  
Once, Lawler made a relatively minor clerical error that resulted in a temporarily 
lost file. It was found seventy-five minutes later in a secretary’s outbox. This was cause 
for a four-page mea culpa from Lawler, using his best bureaucratese, to Assistant 
Director Tamm, explaining that after reviewing the incident in detail, the cause of the 
mix-up was human error.67 The file had simply been mislaid. 
Hoover doled out praise to his agents sparingly and shrewdly. Loyal, trusted 
agents were rewarded with positions as Special Agents in Charge of a local field office. 
SACs were not known for their independence. Rather, they maintained a scrupulous 
adherence to the dictates from the Washington office. Through them flowed the many 
regulations, procedures, policies and rules promulgated from on high, most of which did 
                                                 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Lawler Archive, “Memoranda,” 11 January 1939, Box 3 Folder 38.  
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little to help with actual investigations, and all of which seemed designed to drive field 
agents to distraction. Lawler, with his devotion to the Director and his administrative 
experience, was the perfect candidate for a SAC appointment to a small, unremarkable 
field office. 
His tenure as SAC ran roughly from 1942 until his retirement in 1950. An internal 
review of the Richmond office noted that he inherited a field office in disarray. In short 
order, Agent Lawler was reported to be working hard, and making substantial progress on 
all fronts. His salary was increased to $5000 per annum. It wasn’t until after he accepted 
the position as SAC of the Richmond office, in FBI terms a steady gig, that he married.68 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
68 Lawler Archives, Interview Transcript, Box 1 Folder 1, 3. 
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Spies, Reds, Negroes, and Nips 
 
Richmond, Virginia, could hardly have been called a hotbed of Communist 
ferment in 1945. Previous experiments with Communism among labor groups in 
Virginia’s capital had ended in farce. In the mid-1930s, a New York Communist, Abe 
Tomkin, came to town and joined with activist Thomas Stone to agitate for rights for the 
unemployed. They made one fatal mistake. They organized a group composed mainly of 
Negroes, as sure a way to thwart their hopes for recognition and success in Virginia as 
can be conceived. They attempted marches through downtown, parades of unemployed 
black men demanding the right to work. Soon enough, the mayor unleashed police goon 
squads, and any demonstration became an exercise in intimidation and police brutality. 
Tompkin eventually gave up and left Virginia, convinced, as journalist and historian 
Virginius Dabney would have it, that “conservative Richmond was barren ground for 
Marxist propaganda.”69 
Lawler had a Hooveresque, strict constructionist interpretation of Communism. 
He viewed Communists with contempt, noting dogmatically, “Blind obedience to the 
Moscow dictates must be conceived in the mind of each party functionary and born with 
strict compliance, without benefit of even the slightest flirtation. The Communist Party, 
USA, appears to be a glutton for humiliation. STALIN boots them around, slams doors 
on them, and leaves them out on a limb with every zig and zag, but the party loves 
                                                 
69 Virginius Dabney, Richmond: The Story of a City (New York: Doubleday and 
Company, Inc., 1976), 313-14. 
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STALIN with a suffering submission of a drunkard’s dog and whimpers for more of the 
same embarrassment.”70 This would be the finest prose of Lawler’s career.  
Lawler’s understanding of Communism was straight out of Hoover’s ideological 
playbook. Striking tobacco workers in Norfolk were not really disgruntled employees 
looking for higher wages and better working conditions. Together with food service 
workers, they comprised “a well-coordinated cell,” part of the “menace of 
Communism… a godless stateless, cold-hearted proposition. The sun never sets on 
Communism.”71 Lawler’s statement that “the ultimate objective of the Kremlin is to the 
rule the universe” would sound ridiculous if his actions as an agent didn’t provide ample 
confirmation of his beliefs.72 In his office at least, “we, the FBI, never went undercover. 
We paid informants. Our anti-Communist activities consisted of telephone taps, 
microphone surveillances” and other methods.73  
In investigating Communists, the Bureau strayed into a minefield, and the agents 
and the Bureau’s leadership knew it. SACs in general, and Richmond’s John Lawler in 
particular, undertook illegal methods and tactics fully aware of what they were doing, and 
in fact attempted to cover-up whenever possible. In an organization such as the FBI, 
which was obsessed with rules and regulations, agents knew when their actions fell 
outside legal guidelines. A memo written by William Sullivan, head of intelligence 
operations, makes the case: 
                                                 
70 Lawler Archive, Box 1 Folder 10, “The Communist Party Line.” 
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We do not obtain authorization for ‘black bag’ jobs from outside the Bureau. Such 
a technique involves trespass and is clearly illegal; therefore, it would be 
impossible to obtain any legal sanction for it. Despite this, ‘black bag’ jobs have 
been used because they represent an invaluable technique in combating 
subversive activities of a clandestine nature aimed directly at undermining and 
destroying out nation.74 
 
Sullivan was the third most powerful man at the Bureau in 1966 when he wrote 
these words. It is doubtful that Lawler ever met Sullivan, who joined the Bureau during 
World War II while Lawler was head of the Richmond office. It is striking then the 
similarities between Sullivan’s memo and a statement Lawler made regarding 
investigations of Communists, “When you deal with intelligence work, it’s totally 
different from law enforcement…. You are dealing with people who will undermine our 
form of government. You’re dealing with people that you can’t use the same safeguards, 
constitutional safeguards, as you would use with a criminal activity…. You’ve got to 
fight fire with fire.”75 It is almost as if they are reading from the same script. 
This is no accident. The respective beliefs of these two agents were part of the 
Bureau’s bedrock ideology. And this ideology formed the basis for the actions of SACs 
and field agents, who mouthed these same justifications for over sixty years of 
intelligence work, too often abandoning the very constitutional safeguards here 
mentioned. 
Lawler, along with many of his fellow agents, were converts to the church of anti-
Communism. His career as a federal agent – sworn as such to uphold the Constitution – 
only baptized him in the faith that, in upholding the law, the FBI was above the law. His 
life long he remained unrepentant. Hoover had trained his subaltern well; he was no 
                                                 
74 "’Black Bag’ Jobs,” Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach, 19 
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75 Lawler Archives, Interview Transcript, Box 1 Folder 1, 1. Italics mine. 
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doubt smiling from the fiery depths. But in this Lawler was also a victim of history. Over 
time, the FBI began to see few distinctions between members of labor unions, racial 
agitators, radicals, spies, and Communists. The thread that united them all was a common 
interest in subversion.  
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The FBI in War and Peace 
 
“For war is thought and thought is information, and he who knows most strikes hardest.” From 
“The House on 92nd Street” – in which the FBI unravels a Nazi spy ring operating in Manhattan. 
The movie was made with direct FBI support. 
 
 Throughout the 1930s, Europe began its long, slow slide toward war. For many 
Americans, upset by economic devastation wrought by the Depression, it seemed like 
déjà vu all over again. Under the mantle of national security, the FBI, just as it did in the 
First World War, turbocharged its surveillance programs. The contours of the Bureau’s 
mission were familiar, including investigations of espionage, sabotage, internal security, 
dissemination of propaganda, and anti-war activism. In fact, the precedent for nearly 
everything the FBI did in the years leading up to, and the years during, World War II 
could be found in the time period encompassing that earlier war. In order to use the same 
tactics, which caused them so much grief in the 1910s and early 1920s, they had to make 
adjustments to the more unsavory aspects of their history. They accomplished this by 
recasting their role in the controversial events surrounding the First World War, and the 
gist of their mission in the early 1930s. 
On the eve of the Second World War, a new generation of agents had to be 
indoctrinated about the historical mission of the Bureau. In 1940, Hoover drafted a 
memorandum to set out the official version of the events surrounding the Slacker Raids. 
During the First World War, Bureau agents “were pioneers in this work [arresting 
slackers].” The memorandum admits that in implementing the raids “some confusion and 
lack of judgment in handling individual cases resulted.” But agents in the 1940s need not 
have worried. The history was clear: “In every case it was found that the cause of the 
disturbance was due not to the lack of local patriotism, nor to the administrative methods 
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of the draft, but rather to the pernicious influence of radicals charged with the spirit of 
anarchy and to ignorance and misinformation as to the purpose of the draft and the aims 
of this nation in the war.”76 
This is a fascinating sleight of hand. The memo, it turns out, was not merely 
propaganda; it had a separate, more important function. The final pages of the document 
are an analysis of manpower requirements to enforce the Select Service Act. The 
methodology used is ingenious, if of questionable accuracy. Using Bureau statistics from 
World War I, the author figured the number of draft evaders as a percentage of the 
population. That percentage was then extrapolated into 1940, which gave an estimate of 
the number of draft evaders, or the number of investigations that would have to be carried 
out. With a little mathematical razzle-dazzle, voila: we discover that an agent closes 
“144.08 cases per year,” such that “it will require 1085 agents per year, over a five year 
period” to do these investigations. There would need to be hired “100 agent supervisors, 
500 additional field clerical employees, and 200 clerical employees at the Seat of 
Government.”77 Part of this revisionist history was not only to steel the troops for the 
ideological battle ahead, but also to increase appropriations and manpower. The lever 
Hoover used to pry these funds from Congress was a welter of dazzling and dizzying 
statistics, thrown off with such aplomb that few questioned exactly what he was talking 
about, or where these numbers had come from. 
By setting the earlier war in shadow, the Bureau was able to manipulate the 
debate, such that current policies seemed enlightened, guided by reason and the steady 
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hand of experienced professionals. In a press release attributed to Hoover, the American 
public learned, “World War I taught us a lesson…. U.S. war plants were defenseless 
against sabotage prior to our entry in that earlier war…. Good work [by the Bureau] 
eventually resulted [in preventing sabotage], but witch-hunts, dragnet raids and mob 
hysteria sometimes violated the very purpose of the war ‘to make the world safe for 
Democracy.’”78  
The Plant Survey program, for example, seemed reasonable enough in theory. The 
Bureau trained agents to study “the vulnerable points which may be the objects of attack 
by saboteurs and espionage agents. Recommendations are then made by the Bureau to the 
plant officials who can take steps to see that appropriate barriers will be thrown up to 
thwart the efforts of these destructive agents.”79 
According to the Bureau, this program had a historical dimension: “These same 
subversive forces which are so active now also attempted to wreck America twenty-two 
years ago [during the First World War].”80 Apparently, these subversives, whoever they 
may have been, had a long and spiteful memory to harbor a grudge for so many years. 
This begs the question – how had these subversives eluded the vigilant guardians of 
democracy for so many years? More importantly, in order to provide a suitable context 
for activities such as Plant Surveys, history needed to be revised yet again. This is how 
the FBI characterized the First World War years: 
In 1924… self-appointed investigators, civic groups, law enforcement agencies, 
the armed forces… as well as the Bureau, conducted investigations of spies and 
saboteurs. The result was disastrous. Large espionage rings flourished unimpaired 
because of this hit-and-miss procedure. Explosions, destruction of property, and 
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fires were the order of the day before America marshaled her forces. Our 
industries had no protection and were vulnerable to any attack. Fortunately as the 
War progressed this situation was remedied and the despoilers were thwarted in a 
majority of their plans.81 
 
 This time things would be different, the American public was told, because 
Bureau leader’s were “fortified with experience gained from the last World War,” which 
experience they will use to “stem the tide of subversion.”82 Here again, one can see how 
the jargon the Bureau used during the Red Scare stuck. It survived the years of the First 
World War and was later appropriated to describe their efforts to thwart the menace of 
international communism during the Second World War and beyond. 
Agents were instructed to remember, “Propagandists are, in effect, as a general 
rule, espionage agents in this country performing such acts for Foreign Principals.”83 Did 
‘propagandists’ include those who dissented from support for the war? The answer was 
the same in 1940 as it was in 1917, emphatically yes. And if you were an FBI agent 
sworn to protect the country from enemies foreign and domestic, certain shortcuts could 
be overlooked. Whatever reforms Hoover had instituted in the 1920s were by 1945 
bankrupt; the FBI was a rogue agency. 
In this, Hoover was fed raw meat by no less than FDR. He sicced the FBI on 
administration critics on a regular basis, if only in secret. Presidents had done this before. 
For FDR, it was more a continuation of an established political order than a precedent. 
Later, after the war, Presidents would use the Bureau to spy on suspected Communists, 
who, conveniently enough, were almost always critics of the administration in question. 
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In January 1942, FDR asked Hoover for surveillance in order to “clean up a 
number of… vile publications… [some were] pretty close to being seditious.”84 Many 
might be surprised at the sentiments FDR, bugaboo of conservatives even today, 
expressed in a memo to Attorney General Francis Biddle: “Please read this number of 
‘The Hour’ [a conservative magazine]… I think very definitely that the FBI can run down 
things like this. Senators and members of the Congress are, of course, protected in a 
sense by the Constitution, but this must be strictly construed. There is absolutely no valid 
reason why any suspected subversive activities on their part should not be investigated by 
the Department of Justice or any other duly constituted agency.”85  
This is not exactly Lawler’s belief that you can’t use the same constitutional 
safeguards in intelligence work as you would in criminal investigations, but it is 
uncomfortably close. That seemingly innocuous phrase – ‘in a sense’ – was the thin edge 
of the wedge that the FBI used to pry open a loophole large enough to drive the next 25 
years worth of illegal spying through. The agency had certainly not terminated its 
surveillance programs, even after Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone’s explicit 
admonitions to do so in the early 1920s.  
Although the spying itself was nothing new, FDR did set a precedent by bringing 
spying on American citizens in from the cold, by proclaiming executive authority to 
legitimize spying based on political ideology, to initiate investigations through the 
Department of Justice, and for wartime prerogatives that were constitutionally 
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questionable. In short, FDR gave Hoover a semblance of official cover for doing what he 
had always done.  
Even the Bureau’s idea of espionage was tainted by ideology, a perverted sense of 
nationalism, and sometimes, racism.86 In the pre-war years, the FBI made efforts to know 
the enemy by studying foreign espionage efforts. While working in the Administrative 
Division, Lawler was tasked with researching and writing an outline on Japanese 
attempts to spy on America. Among his papers are handwritten notes, undated, in outline 
form about Japanese espionage. Here is Lawler’s assessment: 
The Japanese conception of intelligence work, especially in espionage, is very 
different from our own. To the Japanese mind every activity in every foreign 
country merits investigation. This characteristic, undoubtedly, springs from the 
sense of inferiority which the Japanese feel towards foreigners. He knows that 
industry and invention mainly comes from the Western civilization and he is 
doing everything in his power to keep pace with the advancement made in those 
countries. These deep-seated feelings, coupled with Japanese energy, Japanese 
suspiciousness and oriental love of intrigue, makes every Japanese a potential, if 
not an actual spy.87  
 
There can be little doubt that such ideas, floating freely about the country at the time, 
formed the basis of FDR’s decision to place people of Japanese origin in internment 
camps.  
Lawler’s handwritten notes on German espionage are another piece of dubious 
history propagated as fact. He wrote, “Remember this – that Hitler[‘s] most effective 
weapon has been to divide and conquer – so those who spread criticism among Law 
Enf[orcement] Officer[s]… in connection with the Int[ernal] Sec[urity] Program are 
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acting the part of Axis agent[s].”88 The Bureau used such rhetoric to justify stifling 
domestic dissent against the war. This conflation of dissent with subversion was the 
underpinning for the agency’s intelligence work long after the war was over. A 
substitution of ‘Communism’ for ‘Hitler’ in the above quoted passage is a suitable 
metaphor for how the Bureau managed to transform the threat from wartime, i.e. the Axis 
Powers, into a postwar Red Scare. 
Lawler’s work in the Administrative Division was not an independent effort. He 
was delineating Bureau policy promulgated from above, perhaps directly from Hoover 
himself. Lawler must have been trusted as espionage was one of the Bureau’s most 
critical responsibilities, and in such important missions nothing was left to chance. 
The FBI’s espionage efforts ended with the war, but the accompanying tactics 
were too valuable to be discarded. A memo Lawler sent to Assistant Director Tamm 
reads like the playbook for investigations of Communists: “Espionage case[s] present to 
some extent a different type of problem than is ordinarily encountered in other cases 
investigated by the Bureau.”89 And all the familiar FBI tactics are laid out – mail covers, 
reading of telegrams, tapping of phones, scouring of bank and financial records, 
neighborhood investigations, and even submission to a polygraph test. And let us not 
forget to shroud these activities in utter secrecy, such that the G-2 (the Army’s 
intelligence branch), Naval Intelligence, the Department of Justice, and the Attorney 
General were kept in the dark until the investigation was a fait accompli.  
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For critics who maintained that these activities would be the same as those used in 
any criminal investigation, there was the inconvenient fact that the overwhelming 
majority of Communism cases involved citizens who had neither broken a law nor who 
were suspected of breaking the law; they were investigations driven by ideology. The 
methods and justifications the Bureau used in espionage investigations stuck. After the 
war these same tactics were expanded upon until they became standard operating 
procedure, particularly effective in Communism cases.  
As the paper trail was the potential smoking gun, new filing procedures were 
instituted, specifically a ‘Do Not File’ designation for those memoranda that were too hot 
to touch.90 During the war, the Bureau perfected taps, bugs, microphones, mail opening 
programs, black bag jobs, and the use of proxies, such as paid informants and patriotic 
citizen informers like the Legionnaires. Of course, none of this was new; the same 
techniques had been used since the First World War, only now they were used with little 
discretion, and more broadly than ever before. They had become institutionalized. They 
were also kept under wraps to a large extent, unknown to Congress, attorneys general, 
presidents, and the public. 
The FBI was not all grey and flannel. Occasionally, they were inspired in carrying 
out their illegal shenanigans, particularly regarding the euphemistically titled 
“’confidential’ means and pretexts.”91 Lawler suggests, for example, that agents might 
pose as a “bug exterminator, fire marshal, air raid warden, utilities employee,” a door-to-
door “radio survey” person, or a representative of a “silk stocking club.” There was also a 
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method by which a suspect was instructed to disrobe during a medical examination with a 
cooperative doctor. An agent waiting in the next room then searched the suspect’s 
clothing.92   
More prosaically, there were mail covers, which came in several varieties. Often, 
a suspect’s trash was collected and sifted by agents for discarded mail, or other 
incriminating information. Mail was opened and photographed, resealed, and sent on its 
way. This was known as ‘chamfering,’ a technique taught to agents by British 
intelligence.93  
Sometimes an agent dropped a newspaper in the mailbox after a suspect mailed a 
letter. This served to isolate the suspect’s letter from subsequent mail dropped into the 
box. Later, a postal official would grant access to the mailbox and the letter could easily 
be located. Lawler sent out a memo urging caution when agents employed the methods of 
copying and tracing. He cited one case where a suspect complained to postal authorities 
that someone was reading his mail. Apparently, whoever had traced over his letter had 
pressed too hard, leaving indentations that were clearly visible to the recipient.94 
Alice Burke was the Chairperson of the Communist Party in Virginia after the 
war. According to Lawler, his agents “had surveillance going on on the phone; we had… 
a microphone inside of Alice’s apartment. We also had a janitor to give us all of the mail 
that she put in her trash basket. We put…a mail cover, in which the post office would put 
a trace on every letter that she got. Then from time to time we would follow her. And 
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from time to time we would break into her home.”95 This is Lawler’s fond remembrance 
thirty-five years after the fact, so casually stated that one might be tempted to forget that 
most of these activities were illegal. 
Did agents realize what they were doing was against the law? Lawler answered 
that question without meaning to. He fondly remembered his investigations of Alice 
Burke, saying, “I will never forget one young agent said, ‘What will we do if she comes 
in here now [after the agents had broken into Burke’s home]?’ I said, ‘We’ll cross that 
bridge when we get to it.’ And when we’d do something like that, we’d have other agents 
in the cars out following her all over town. But we had access to her apartment, keys to 
everything.” All this could be justified because Communists were trying to “undermine 
our form of government.”96 You just couldn’t use the same constitutional safeguards with 
Communists as you did with ordinary criminals, who, boringly enough, simply broke the 
law.  
 Another way to get around those constricting constitutional safeguards was 
simply to destroy evidence. For example, internal security documents relating to Alice 
Burke were given the numerical designation ‘100-801.’ As surveillance transcripts make 
painfully clear, most of the recorded conversations of Alice Burke are mind numbingly 
boring. They have nothing to do with revolution, subversion, spying or anything of that 
ilk. But agency policy, and the dictates of intelligence gathering, demanded that 
transcripts be taken, that memoranda be written, studied, and retained.  
After a time, it became too much for Lawler, who recommended a solution to the 
burgeoning size of File 100-801. In a hand written sidebar to one of his agents, he opined, 
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“Largest amt. of bulky exhibits in whole office is in this file – I know we can’t and 
shouldn’t destroy but can we selectively get rid of gen’l rubbish on this where couldn’t 
possibly be used in court. Would you review this and the 100 logs sometime. [sic]”97 
General rubbish indeed. The logs referred to were ledger books that recorded “the visits, 
arrivals, departures, and other required data at the plants [or ‘technical plants,’ a 
euphemism for a surveillance set-up].”98 That there were at least a hundred of them 
speaks to the enormous number of man-hours and the amount of resources the agency 
squandered in chasing ghosts.  
This episode does not represent a nascent rebellious streak in Lawler. He was 
merely being over-scrupulous when hinting at the illegality of destroying evidence, for it 
was Hoover’s stated policy to do so. In June 1946, instructions went out to all stations, 
“No printed form should be used for the log but the log should be maintained on blank 
letter-size paper which contains no printing and no government watermark. Logs shall be 
prepared… in longhand…. These logs shall be retained for a period of one year after 
which time they shall be destroyed.”99 
Just how threatening was the Communist Party in Virginia? Were these types of 
activities necessary to prevent hordes of Bolsheviks from overrunning the state house, or 
city hall? During one of the frequent break-ins of Alice Burke’s apartment, agents 
obtained a list of every member of the Communist Party in Virginia, complete with 
names, addresses, telephone numbers, and sometimes employment information. In 1948, 
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there were 31 Communists on the rolls in the city of Richmond. In District No. 26, 
encompassing all of Virginia, there were 233 Communists on the rolls, and this at the 
party’s peak of popularity in the state.100 
Confidential Informant R-169 “whose identity is known to the Bureau, on 
February 24, 1948, turned over to Special Agent Sterling B[unclear] trash discarded by 
Mrs. Alice Burke, Chairman, Communist Party USA, District 26.”101 This informant 
lived in the same building as Burke at 11 North Linden Street. He was a long-term asset 
so the Bureau provided remuneration by paying his rent. He attended all the meetings of 
the Party in Virginia, and provided reports in the form of detailed transcripts of what was 
said, and who was saying it.  
For a man of the right temperament, spying could be a lifelong profession. 
Lawler’s informant, R-161, was such a man. In addition to reporting on Communist 
meetings in Richmond and other parts of Virginia, he double-dipped, working also as a 
labor spy. While working at the Mill Creek Coal and Coke Company, his professional 
curiosity was piqued by another man, Frank C. Thompson. R-161 became suspicious of 
Thompson’s behavior when he (Thompson) “exposed a foreigner who was trying to 
organize the IWO. He thought… I was a Control man for the company…. He confided he 
was working for the Pinkerton Detective Agency.”102 It turned out that Thompson was 
“in criminal cases and not in labor espionage when he was working for Pinkerton.” 
Thompson showed R-161 a paper that listed his credentials from World War I as 
                                                 
100 Lawler Archive, Box 4, Folder 64, “Communist Party Members,” 10 March 
1948, Memo for SAC from Andrew A. Armstrong, Jr. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Lawler Archive, Box 4 Folder 63A, “Communist Activities,” File # 66-1228A. 
 47
“Director of Military Intelligence.” R-161, impressed by how long Thompson had been in 
the intelligence game, asked his Bureau handler for permission to recruit the older spy.103 
 That those who inform to the FBI might have had a personal agenda in so doing 
was one obvious downfall of the arrangement: “We have found that in numerous 
instances complaints were made because of political bias, religious or other 
prejudices.”104Another was that money for information was powerful incentive for job 
security.105 Aside from these specific issues, there was the general unease resulting from 
citizens spying and informing on one another.  
Every FBI agent worth his salt had sources. It’s how business got done. While 
SAC in Richmond, Lawler developed contacts with businessmen, lawyers, accountants, 
bank managers, hotel clerks, bellboys, taxi drivers, gamblers, madams, State officials, 
city officials, regional directors of the CIO and other labor organizations – the list goes 
on and on. Asking questions about illegal activities is on its face a legitimate police 
function, and good investigative management. But documents in the Lawler archive 
reveal that things were not quite what they seemed. Lawler’s sources sometimes became 
spies. 
What happens when a criminal defense attorney pimps for the FBI? Or when a 
City Hall Tax Clerk provides the Bureau with tax returns on the sly, without benefit of a 
warrant? Or when the Business Manager of the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone 
Company provides phone records as a favor? Or when the Superintendent of Western 
Union Telegraph Company passes along private, privileged correspondence on his own 
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initiative? Was Henry Schwarzschild, partner in Schwarzschild Jewelers, informing on 
Jewish criminal activities to do away with competition, or from an abundance of 
patriotism? Were gamblers sacrificing others to save themselves?  
Did the FBI know that some sources were acting illegally in providing 
information? Lawler did. One memo he authored has all the attributes of a smoking gun:  
The Confidential Sources of Information, which were separated from Confidential 
Informants at the instructions of the Bureau, include telephone company contacts, 
Western Union contacts and other places of business such as banks, public health 
departments and Unemployment Compensation Commissions, which are 
prohibited either by law from furnishing information or make it impractical to 
furnish such information generally due to the possibility of suits.106 
 
At least these informants were flesh and blood. Confidential Informant R-155 was 
a microphone planted during an illegal break-in at Burke’s home.107 Confidential 
Informant R-182 was a wiretap, called ‘Technical Surveillance’ to distinguish it from 
other forms.108 This may sound silly on its face, but when the Bureau passed along cases 
for prosecution, they used these designations without revealing who, or in this case what, 
the sources were. In this way, they were able to keep the programs secret, away from 
prying eyes of attorneys general, and to insulate themselves from public criticism. At the 
same time, they could claim they had the Communist threat well in hand.  
For agents, and SACs specifically, the subterfuge surrounding sources and 
methods led to confusion, like a lie told once that needs to be remembered ever after. At 
times, agents had to futz with the details of informant testimony in order to protect the 
illegality of its provenance, for example a microphone, or a bug. In a memorandum to the 
                                                 
106 Lawler Archive, Crime Survey #7, 10. Italics mine. 
107 Lawler Archive, Box 3 Folder 38, “Internal Memoranda #100-801,” 11 
February 1949. 
108 Ibid. 
 49
Director, Lawler defensively suggests that perhaps, “accuracy of statements could have 
been sacrificed for a better protection of the informant… if these statements had been 
made by a live informant.” This was a big problem for agents, and put them between the 
devil and the deep blue sea. They had to guard against the “possibility of anyone, 
reviewing the report, coming to the conclusion that they were technical, microphone or 
live informants.”109  
 During the years that Burke lived in Apartment 2, 11 North Linden Street, the FBI 
paid at least one informant to live in the same building. Lawler, via the FBI, paid rent 
each month to the building’s owner. He used this influence to buy the building, which he 
later sold to Virginia Commonwealth University in the 1970s.110 It is not known how 
prevalent was this sort of graft, but this example clearly demonstrates how starting down 
the path of shadowy illegal activities can lead to a slippery slope. The justifications 
would begin to pile up until agents could rationalize enriching themselves through the 
prerogatives of their office.  
 This parochial perspective, when broadened to encompass the Bureau’s 
Communist activities nationwide, reveals the staggering resources and manpower 
employed - the dimensions of this folly are hard to reconcile. Consider too that the 
Bureau was only one arm, albeit the largest, of a national intelligence effort against 
American citizens who were Communists, or who were thought to be sympathetic to the 
cause.  
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The Bureau was convinced that Communism was going to use labor groups as a 
Trojan horse in order to gain a foothold in this country. Hoover’s thoughts became 
Bureau policy, “I want to point out again that control of labor organizations is the base on 
which the Communist program in this country has been formulated. The degree of 
Communist infiltration and domination of the organized labor movement in the United 
States will determine the success of Communist Political Association activities during the 
remainder of the war and in the postwar period.”111  
 In 1939, there were 713 FBI agents; by 1945 the number had increased more than 
600 percent to 4370 agents.112 After the war, these agents were for the most part without 
a mission. Not to fear, for a new mission needed only an old foe; the Bureau’s fallback 
nemesis was labor. This time, though, there was a new wrinkle - race. The Director’s 
instructions were clear, reminding agents to remain vigilant: “The Bureau is still 
interested in receiving information with respect to labor disturbances which involve… 
actual or impending strikes or other labor disturbances which appear to be Communist 
inspired or promoted… [and] actual or impending strikes or other labor disturbances 
which involve racial agitations.”113  
As this memorandum suggests, strikes inspired by Communists and disturbances 
by Negroes were distinct events, and were considered separate activities perpetrated by 
separate groups. Soon enough though they would become, in the peculiar conspiratorial 
logic of the FBI, conflated into one threat. Communists did not help their cause by 
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advocating for racial equality. Alice Burke was explicit, in that the party’s “greatest 
contribution had been the fight for complete equality for the Negro people.”114 
To be sure, being a Communist in post-war America was a peculiar sort of 
optimism. In fact, the broader liberal movements, such as the fight for racial equality and 
voting rights, union organization, and other progressive social ideas, were nationwide 
having to beat against the gates of entrenched conservatism. Nowhere was this truer than 
in the Southern states. John Egerton, elegantly as ever, summed up, “Idealism certainly 
pointed the South toward a democratic future – but realism and tradition stood in the 
way.”115 Burke’s belief in the Party’s contribution toward racial equality in Virginia 
would certainly be considered idealistic, or looking through the wrong end of a telescope.  
Even though one social scientist maintained that progressive groups “softened up 
the South,” the American Left was on the ropes.116 The war had greatly expanded the 
federal government’s influence, as it was able to provide crucial goods and services that 
localities and states could not. One of the great results of the New Deal was a “breaking 
down of those sectional barriers… [that] compelled all Americans to think in national 
rather than regional terms.”117 Progressives had plenty of causes to raise the standard for, 
but there was less unity on the left among the forces for change, than there was among 
the conservative orthodoxy.  
In the influential magazine Life, Arthur Schlesinger introduced the formulation, 
which seems passing strange today, that Communists were the greatest threat to the 
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left.118 Richard Powers thought much the same thing, noting, “The old unity of the left 
that had been destroyed in the twenties, but had reemerged during the thirties, had been 
shattered again by the Cold War…. The Cold War… split the left between supporters and 
critics of a foreign policy of containing the spread of communism.”119 
The changes wrought by the war threatened conservatives, and they weren’t going 
down without a fight. Truman caved to pressure from the right and passed an executive 
order, which required all federal employees to certify that they were loyal to America, 
and that they weren’t Communists. A similar proviso was part of the Taft-Hartley Act, 
which stuck a knife into the heart of organized labor, forcing restrictions on a union’s 
power and its latitude in worker actions, and requiring that union members renounce any 
affiliation with the Communist Party. In effect, the federal government was flexing its 
anti-Red muscles. 
It is one of history’s ironies that at the time of greatest anti-Communist fervor in 
this country the party itself was dysfunctional. Further, a host of the most important 
things they were fighting for, “a minimum wage, unemployment insurance, a five-day 
workweek, reform of child labor, old-age pensions – were destined to become essential 
elements of American democracy.”120 But the bait and switch continued to be 
Communism and race. It took no great effort of imagination to see how the fight for 
social change could be construed as a Communist pas de deux. In Egerton’s memorable 
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phrase, “The segregationist Southern Democrats proceeded to dine freely on red herrings 
for the next generation.”121 
 The Bureau’s racial policies in 1945 were predicated on beliefs in line with those 
of many Virginians at the time. Racial agitation was closely monitored, especially in the 
southern states. During the war, Lawler sent a memo to headquarters, warning, “That a 
few Negroes have pro-Japanese tendencies…. Also indications have been received 
reflecting a change in attitude of the Negroes in this area… there is said to be a rumor 
being spread among the Negroes that they are an oppressed race. Investigation… is being 
conducted to identify the sources of pro-Japanese sentiment and source of rumors 
thereof.”122  
That blacks in Richmond, Virginia, in 1945 would need to start a rumor of their 
own oppression is frankly absurd. That it was a rumor the Bureau took seriously enough 
to investigate is instructive. It is no surprise that the informant for this shocking piece of 
news was himself black. With wisdom derived from hard experience, he advised his 
handler, “The Negro situation in this area is [not] anything to worry about.”123 
 Perhaps the ruckus could be explained in part by the fact that affluent whites were 
losing their servants to the draft. A whisper campaign propagated rumors that “Eleanor 
Clubs” with pro-Axis sympathies were popping up in the Negro community. And Alice 
Burke had the temerity to condemn “the laws prevalent in the State of Virginia regarding 
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segregation. The Party in the State has also called for social equality for Negroes and 
white people. One of its other chief aims is to abolish the poll tax.”124  
This was tantamount to blasphemy. The Richmond office concluded that though 
there was no organized movement, “In all localities of the State…there have been reports 
of un-Americanism on the part of individual Negroes.”125 These incidents illustrate how 
rumor and information passed along by biased informants with a personal axe to grind 
could lead agents down the garden path. 
 The quixotic adventure to link the struggle for civil rights with Communism led to 
some bizarre consequences. One report stated, “Information has recently been received 
indicating that a Communist Party member while conducting a surveillance on an 
individual who was under suspicion was armed with a revolver. Other information has 
been received recently indicating that the Communist Party in one area was obtaining 
souvenir guns for distribution among negroes.”126 Aside from the unclear syntax and 
confusing lack of punctuation (who had the gun – the person doing the surveillance, or 
the person under surveillance?), one wonders why the revolutionary Party that posed the 
greatest threat to the institutions of American democracy would be distributing souvenir 
guns in the first place. Could they not afford to buy and distribute real guns? If not, 
whither the threat? 
 The reliability of informers was a constant headache for the Bureau. When 
national labor union officials and the public got wind of investigations into labor 
disputes, they raised a holy stink. But, in typical fashion, it was not the Bureau’s fault. 
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They claimed they were misunderstood, “The purposes and subject matters of the 
[investigations of Bureau activities] have been falsified by inference and by complete 
untruth; and the FBI and the Department of Justice have thereby been placed in an 
unfavorable position.”127 This was cold comfort to field agents, who complained bitterly 
about investigations that were time-consuming, difficult, and politically sensitive, but 
which bore no fruit.128 
Many studies have focused on Hoover’s ideological obsession with Communism 
and Communists. But when examined on a local level, when dissecting the nuts and bolts 
of investigations of American citizens who called themselves Communists, or were so-
called by the Bureau, the effort seems largely a waste of time, money, and manpower. 
The bloated bureaucracy and the greatly expanded roster of field agents that were 
both a legacy of the Second World War needed to be justified somehow. Few would cast 
a gimlet eye upon a routine investigation of Alice Burke for being head of the 
Communist Party in Virginia, but the breadth, the depth, and the scope of the 
investigation, and the illegal methods and tactics employed by agents was overkill. It far 
exceeded in damage, and in plain futility, what it gained in valuable information. Field 
agents became so compromised by the creeping line of end-justifies-the-means, that they 
became ineffective investigators.  
Short cuts taken in intelligence investigations would become standard operating 
procedure; later they became last year’s model and even more lines between legality and 
illegality were crossed. The strongest hand the agency had was always in criminal 
investigations, in which it could bring to bear its vast resources. When sticking to good 
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old-fashioned police work, the Bureau could be effective and efficient. Intelligence work 
blunted this efficiency and subsequently their effectiveness. 
 A burglary in Richmond in February 1949, which became the Schwarzschild 
Brothers Jewel Robbery Case, reveals what the FBI could accomplish when it stuck to its 
stated mission of fighting crime. The case is worth examining in some detail. On 
February 11, 1949, Robert Pinkerman visited Schwarzschild Brothers Jewelry Store at 
111 E. Broad Street. He was looking for an engagement ring. He suddenly felt ill and 
asked to use the bathroom, which was located on the second floor. On his way to the 
bathroom, he surreptitiously unlocked a window in a nearby hallway that gave onto the 
roof of the building next door. He then returned to the showroom, told the clerk he’d 
return later with his fiancé, and left.  
 On the same day, in the building two doors down, a man appeared in a dentist’s 
office asking where a different doctor’s office was located. The dentist’s office gave onto 
the same rooftop as that of the window opened by Pinkerman. The next day two men 
bought an oxy-acetylene rig from a local welding supply store, saying they were opening 
a jewelry repair business.  
 Two days later, on Monday morning, S. M. and Henry Schwarzschild arrived at 
their store on Broad Street to find that they had been burgled – more than $220,000 in 
jewelry had been stolen. The safe, equipped with burglar-proof locks and a tear gas 
system that would activate if the safe were blown, had been skillfully cut open with an 
oxy-acetylene torch. Somehow, the burglars knew exactly where to cut to avoid setting 
off the gas. The burglars had made a calculation, which turned out to be a mistake, to 
leave the tanks behind. 
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The thieves had broken into the dentist’s office, crossed the adjoining roof, and 
crawled through the window unlocked by Pinkerman. They then used rope to lower their 
equipment into a second floor hallway. The rope was left dangling in place, perhaps to 
tantalize the police, perhaps as a result of their haste to flee the scene.  
 The Richmond Police and the FBI cooperated in investigating the crime, with the 
feds leading the way. The oxy-acetylene tanks were traced and descriptions were taken of 
two men. A blue tarpaulin used to enclose the safe so that passersby didn’t see the light 
from the cutting torch was traced to a Sears Roebuck store in Lexington, Kentucky. The 
Bureau scoured their files for known jewel thieves; statements were taken; alibis were 
checked. A snitch in Kansas City informed on Robert Pinkerman and William Henry 
Flowers, aka Howard Baker, as being involved in the Schwarzschild job. Flowers was 
found in Missouri and arrested on an outstanding federal warrant for an unrelated 
incident. In the trunk of his car was a Pennsylvania license plate. It had been issued to 
Howard Baker one month before the robbery. 
 Inexplicably, Flowers asked to visit his safe deposit box, which he did in the 
company of an FBI agent and a US Marshall. There were eleven pieces of jewelry in the 
box. On his finger at the time of his arrest was a one-and-a-half carat diamond. A 
diamond expert certified that these items were stolen from Schwarzschild in Richmond.  
 Meanwhile, the feds checked over 20,000 parking tickets for garages in 
Richmond, something only the Bureau had the resources to accomplish in a timely 
manner. A ticket issued for a car registered to Henry William Bostelmann raised a flag. 
“Monte” Bostelmann had a long criminal history, and had served time for burglary, hold-
ups, bank robbery, and safe cracking. Bostelmann had served time with Flowers in 
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Colorado. At that Colorado penitentiary was a guard named Doc Jamison. This was the 
name used by Bostelmann when he bought the oxy-acetylene rig in Richmond. While 
incarcerated in Colorado, Bostelmann occasionally did favors for the prison warden, 
opening safes for local businessmen when they had lost or forgotten the combination. He 
never failed to open any safe he was asked to crack. 
 An enormous number of hotel registration records for Richmond were searched, 
and several hundred possibilities set aside for consideration. Bureau handwriting experts 
examined these cards and three positive matches were found – Robert Pinkerman, Henry 
William Bostelmann, and William Henry Flowers.  
 While all this was happening, a burglar was caught red-handed in a North 
Carolina department store. The FBI examined his burglar’s tools, one of which was a 
custom-made jimmy bar of unusual design. The burglar was a known associate of both 
Pinkerman and Flowers. Bureau lab technicians followed a hunch and discovered that 
tool marks found at the scene at Schwarzschild’s in Richmond matched the custom 
jimmy bar. When confronted with this evidence, the North Carolina burglar admitted that 
he borrowed the tools from Flowers, a sort of criminal tool swap. 
 The preponderance of this forensic evidence yielded convictions of each of the 
three men – Flowers got twenty years, Pinkerman eight years, and Bostelmann four 
years.129 This case clearly shows the Bureau at its best, investigating, following leads, 
using the resources it possessed to best effect.  
Lawler was intimately involved in the investigation. He oversaw the Bureau’s 
effort and was the liaison with the local police. For this effort, he received a letter of 
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commendation from Hoover, and he was “recommended… for a meritorious [pay] 
increase.”130  
There is much left out of this account to be sure, but the point is clear – the FBI 
was good at crime solving. They knew how to run investigations, and prepare evidence 
for trial. Intelligence operations threw this expertise over the fence in favor of spying and 
extra- or quasi-legal shenanigans. The question has to be asked – at what cost?  
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(Highly) Organized Crime in Richmond 
 
In Richmond, as in most cities, organized crime and corruption were conjoined; 
they fed each other. The Richmond office knew a lot about these activities and reported 
on them to FBI headquarters in yearly crime surveys. The Lawler Archive contains 
reports for the years 1944 through 1950. 
 The Richmond office got religion about organized crime in 1945. Lawler noted, 
“Mark Hannah Boyd… is characterized as the leader of one of the most notorious and 
profitable underworld gangs who operate in Richmond…. The activities of this gang, 
while known to all law enforcement agencies in this area, operate in defiance of them, 
due to their shrewdness to evade the tentacles of the law, as well as having their activities 
covered by a limited amount of protection.”131 The gang’s main activities included high 
jacking liquor shipments, bootlegging, black market dealings, and gambling, and it had 
connections with organizations up and down the Atlantic seaboard from New York to 
North Carolina.132  
 Like most successful organizations, the Boyd gang was efficient, organized, and 
diverse. Moonshine liquor was trucked in from Baltimore to a farm in Henrico County 
owned by a gang member. The hooch was then colored, bottled, and labeled for 
distribution in the city. Other gang members ‘owned’ gas stations, bought for them by 
Boyd, which served as distribution centers for liquor, stolen property, and 
pornography.133  
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Corrupt police officers provided an umbrella of protection for these activities. The 
Complaint Clerk of the Richmond Police Department, through whom all department 
communications were cleared, was a Boyd henchman who provided tip-offs about police 
activities when necessary. Another officer was the gang’s bookkeeper. He provided job 
security for himself by shaking down madams for protection money. Coincidentally, this 
man had a long uninterrupted civil service career - in 1961 he was Richmond City 
Treasurer.134 The Bureau had little difficulty convincing Ann Christian, “A then 
notorious madam of a house of prostitution in Richmond,” to rat out the dirty cop, 
“Officer Burroughs.”135 Note the moralistic and sexist tone, wherein a cooperative 
madam is “notorious,” while a thoroughly corrupt policeman is unburdened by any 
disparaging adjectives. 
 During the war, the Boyd gang also had a hand in the black market. The Director 
of the Bureau of Weights and Measures, who served as the coordinator between the city 
and the Rationing Board, was caught along with two Boyd gang associates operating a 
black market in gasoline rationing coupons.136 Boyd’s lawyer, who attempted 
unsuccessfully to bribe the presiding judge’s clerk, defended the three men at trial.137  
The gang’s reach extended into the leadership of the Richmond Police 
Department. When four police officers were caught “casing, fingering, and guarding” 
stores so that criminals could blow the safes and rob them, Chief E.H. Organ took his 
case to the mayor.138 The FBI concluded that a Boyd lieutenant, Roland Wright, had 
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organized this scheme. Chief Organ tried to persuade the mayor not to fire the officers, as 
Wright was so dangerous he could have anyone killed at any time. The claim that the 
Richmond Police could not provide for the safety of their own seems barely credible. 
When another officer was caught stealing while on duty, Wright posted his bail.139 At 
trial, Wright acted as a character witness for the officer, claiming he “had known 
[Officer] Browning for several years and had never before heard anything in derogation 
of his character.”140 
Roland Wright had the right kind of friends – crime kingpins and police officers. 
But he was also an intelligent and pragmatic man – despite having a long criminal record, 
he once ran for Justice of the Peace.141 Overall, this illustrates the gang’s sophisticated 
understanding of the legal and political system of local governance, and the structures of 
power and protection in Richmond.  
Boyd worked his system from the street upward, bribing policemen, local city 
officials, and others he could exploit for protection and for monetary gain. Their 
operations were so wide ranging that they brushed up against the activities of another 
gang that operated in Richmond at the time, the Byrd Organization, the eponymous 
political machine run by Senator Harry Byrd. 
The Byrd Machine completely dominated Virginia’s political scene for nearly 
forty years. The outlines of the Organization began in the 1920s after Byrd was elected 
governor. His support, and the source for much of the power he wielded as governor and 
Democratic party leader, came mainly from the rural Southside. This conservative bloc 
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joined with Byrd to support the dread poll tax, “An electoral mechanism that obstructed 
the mobilization of poor voters who would likely oppose [the] Organization.”142 It was a 
very successful tactic. In her examination of race and democracy in the South, Patricia 
Sullivan conceded that only “11 percent of eligible voters were registered.”143  
Historians have spilled some ink on Byrd and his machine. Some are inclined to 
be more generous than others about his political leadership during the transitional post-
war years. Byrd is sometimes put forth as a benign representative of Virginia’s 
paternalistic political establishment. One commentator noted, “He was never a dictator 
and did not gain great personal wealth at the public's expense. That's not the Virginia 
way. This is a state where political and economic conflicts were traditionally resolved in 
a genteel manner.”144  
Political scientist Frank Atkinson similarly played down the more unseemly parts 
of the Byrd Organization. His Harry Byrd was an indefatigable Virginia hero, “Staunchly 
conservative in his political views, steadfast in his devotion to Virginia, honest, 
seemingly tireless, always engaging and personable, Harry Byrd was respected and 
revered by Virginians like no other.”145  
Virginius Dabney, ever the paternalist, came at the problem of the Organization’s 
monkeyshines somewhat obliquely: “The refusal of the Democratic organization over a 
period of generations to do anything to stop these absent-voter and poll-tax frauds is 
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something which has never been satisfactorily explained. Political morality in Virginia is 
of so high an order in other respects that this long-continued lapse is the more disturbing. 
The crookedness was confined almost entirely to one section of the state, but much more 
determined efforts should have been made to stop it.”146 
Political scientist V.O. Key provided a more clear-eyed picture of Byrd and his 
machine. He argued, “Of all the American states, Virginia can lay claim to the most 
thorough control by an oligarchy. Political power has been closely held by a small group 
of leaders who, themselves and their predecessors, have subverted democratic institutions 
and deprived most Virginians of a voice in their government… It is a political museum 
piece.”147  
How did this oligarchy work? It was common knowledge, for example, that the 
Director of Public Safety (who was essentially the Police Commissioner), the Chief of 
Police, and many of the tangential positions integral to the administration of justice in the 
city (such as court clerks, sheriffs, bailiffs, etc.) were political appointees who owed their 
positions to the Byrd Machine.148 By this list, it is evident that people in positions of 
power, who were beholden to Byrd and his organization, were the same people Boyd 
exploited to maintain his criminal enterprise.  
When persuasion was not enough to achieve their objectives, Democrats resorted 
to more forthright tactics. In an election in Dickerson County in 1943, Republicans 
complained about serious voting irregularities. Judge Joseph L. Cantwell led a grand jury 
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probe of Republican allegations of fraud, ballot tampering, and vote theft by local 
Democratic elections officials. He concluded that these local officials (Democrats) acted 
“as though… with the purpose of seeing that no possible election vice be left undone.”149 
Even if the FBI did not maintain as much, Judge Cantwell certainly considered political 
corruption to be ‘vice.’ 
 The FBI could not help but notice that the Byrd Organization had Virginia in 
political lock down. The surveys mention doctored vote counts, fraud by judges, stolen 
polling books, corrupt election officials in county offices – in short, the system was 
examined and found to be grossly deficient in fairness and accountability from stem to 
stern. There is no record of an FBI investigation into these allegations. 
Lawler and his agents studied the Byrd machine in some detail. They outlined the 
methods the organization used to maintain its hold on power: 
The State Compensation Board is composed of three state officials appointed by 
the Governor. Those officials are certain to be members of the ‘The Organization’ 
when the Governor belongs to that faith, as he nearly always does, and they fix 
the salaries and expense allowances for the important local officers throughout the 
state. Every Sheriff, Commissioner of Revenue, Commonwealth Attorney, 
Treasurer and City Sergeant is dependent upon the Board at Richmond for their 
scale of pay, which can be raised or lowered by the Board within specified 
brackets. The Board also had the power to fix the ‘expenses’ of these officials, a 
rather flexible term. It not only controls the Clerk’s expenses but the salaries of 
his staff.150 
 
The surveys provide clear evidence that the FBI knew about the corruption in 
local politics. They reported, “Captain L.C. Haake of the Richmond Police Department 
was recently promoted to that position as a result of being able to ‘throw’ the election in 
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Richmond to candidate William C. Herbert, who is the present Mayor of the City of 
Richmond.”151 
Sometimes, the interests of both gangs collided, even if they didn’t realize it.  
Moffett Wilbourn, Mark Boyd’s right hand man, was the nephew of then Lieutenant 
Governor (later Governor) William Tuck. From time to time, Tuck interceded on behalf 
of his nephew whenever Wilbourn found himself in legal straits. In 1946, Governor Tuck 
tried to strong-arm early parole for his wayward nephew. He sent Wilbourn’s son to see 
Russell Devine, a 23-year veteran of the Virginia State Board of Parole. Devine turned 
down the request for early parole as it was clearly a case of influence and not standard 
parole board procedure. Subsequently, Devine was called to the carpet and summarily 
fired by Tuck. It should come as no surprise that parole board members were political 
appointees and as such were beholden to the party in power at the time.152 
The Byrd Machine had groomed Tuck for the governor’s office, a fact known to 
the FBI. One informant relayed that Tuck had confided that when he (Tuck) became 
governor, “Slot machines would be able to operate in the State of Virginia without any 
interference from the Virginia State Police.”153 
Most Richmonders would scarcely have recognized the portrait of their hometown 
as painted by the FBI in their Crime Surveys. The depth and breadth of the criminal 
enterprises are surprising even today. But historians of Virginia politics would no doubt 
have to revise their assessments of Byrd and his machine if they had been privy to 
information provided by the FBI’s sources.   
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 The similarities between how the Boyd Gang and the Byrd Machine maintained 
their respective influence masks a larger framework for debate – is there some moral 
equivalency, or distinction, between subverting democracy in a macro-societal way, 
through manipulation of the political process, and undermining societal norms and 
standards through common-as-muck criminal enterprises? Is one worse than the other? 
The FBI seems to have answered this question, even if they didn’t ostensibly ask it.  
 When presented without context, the following observation would apply equally 
to both organizations: “The activities of this gang, while known to all law enforcement 
agencies in this area, operate in defiance of them, due to their shrewdness to evade the 
tentacles of the law, as well as having their activities covered by a limited amount of 
protection.”154 The FBI did little about violations perpetrated by the Byrd Organization, 
even though federal statutes dealing with election fraud were explicit and numerous.  
The Bureau “Manual of Instruction” expends twenty-one pages delineating the methods 
and procedures for election fraud investigations.155 
Richmond was run by a coterie of rich, powerful, white men who were careful to 
exercise power and influence in a controlled manner. V.O. Key’s concept of Virginia’s 
political scene as a “museum of democracy” is perspicacious for there was democracy on 
display for all to see only one shouldn’t look too closely. The crime surveys are detailed 
and specific about laws being broken. Obviously the Byrd Machine was afforded some 
kind of protection, for its grip on power ended only with Harry Byrd’s retirement in 
1965, and not as a result of federal indictments. The Richmond office of the FBI did not 
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proffer federal charges of any kind against Mark Boyd. Through its inaction, the FBI 
acted to preserve the status quo in Richmond.  
Contrast this with Communism investigations, in which mere suspicion was 
enough to trigger an investigation. The time and resources spent in investigating Alice 
Burke, who had broken no laws, dwarfed those used to combat corruption. And yet, as an 
old man looking back on his career, what Lawler remembered most fondly, what he was 
most proud of was combating agents of Communism, not crime bosses. In his reverie, he 
didn’t even bother to conceal the illegal methods he and his agents used.  
Bureau historian John Fox is understandably defensive about the Bureau’s record. 
He maintained, “A lot of what has been written has been [by] those sympathetic to 
Communists of the day. I think the story is different than that.”156 He asserted that the 
FBI was not an ideological organization; that investigations of Communists were 
legitimate because they were matters of national security. This argument is baffling. It 
seems aimed more at a contemporary audience, and in response to issues of national 
security that pertain to today’s world.  
Whatever the case may be, the documentary evidence in the Lawler archive 
refutes this claim. It reveals an agency fully cognizant of its institutional power and 
prestige; an agency willing to use that power to gather information for unclear objectives; 
an agency very adept at gathering intelligence, but unwilling or unable to provide 
analysis of that intelligence data. Intelligence operations require power and secrecy, 
neither of which requires an understanding of the larger picture that data represents, or 
fits into. Analysis requires some contextual understanding beyond mere gathering: the 
                                                 
156 Telephone interview, 25 April 2006. 
 69
Bureau excelled at the latter and virtually ignored the former. The battles it chose to fight 
were less about enforcement of the law than about upholding a prevailing myth the 
agency believed about itself and did much to propagate for public consumption. The 
ramifications of this failure would resound down through the subsequent decades and 
indeed are evident today. 
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Conclusion 
 
 The FBI is iconic. It’s a brand - t-shirts, caps and sweatshirts with the famous 
acronym are big sellers. Every season brings a new Hollywood movie featuring the 
Bureau, sometimes as savior, sometimes as devil. It is considered an elite law 
enforcement agency, probably the most well known such agency in the world. And yet, 
the Bureau has been involved in events that strain credulity – how could they have 
missed 911, after the 1993 World Trade Center bombings, with all the warnings? The 
FBI’s failure to prevent the attacks of September 11, 2001 was the final result of a 
process that had begun many decades ago. The more one learns about the history of the 
Bureau, the more familiar these failings sound.  
 It began life as an investigative agency, and has struggled ever since to convince 
itself and the American public that that is its primary mission. But that simply isn’t the 
whole story. The FBI was almost from the beginning an intelligence agency, which 
sounds benign until you scratch at it a little. The anti-immigrant ferment in American 
society in the pre-World War I era was reflected in investigations the fledgling agency 
undertook in its earliest years. Suddenly, radicals, or ‘subversives,’ a favorite term of 
Bureau leadership, were suspect because they too loudly demanded their rights, too 
clearly exposed the corruption and inequities inherent in the Progressive era and 
throughout the early years of the twentieth century. American society had not quite 
caught up to the ideals the founding fathers expressed in the Constitution, a radical, some 
might say subversive, document in itself.  
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 For nearly half a century, a paranoid, dogmatic, reactionary, vengeful ideologue 
ran the agency like a fiefdom. His power went virtually unchecked. Presidents used him 
and Bureau resources for their own ends, which were too often political in nature. One 
crucial lesson to learn from J. Edgar Hoover’s tenure is that the power of the Director 
must be limited. Additionally, Congress must provide scrupulous oversight, which, for 
far too many years, was not done. Hoover deserves whatever slings and arrows of 
opprobrium that have come his way, but no man, no matter how great or powerful, can 
fend off a mutiny for fifty years. Field agents and SACs were complicit in subverting the 
rule of law, the documentary evidence is most clear on this point. Their role in the up and 
down history of the agency they served, and helped to define, has received too little 
attention from historians.    
John Edward Lawler might serve as an historical lesson in this regard. His 
relatively successful career is in many ways illustrative of how sincere, intelligent, 
morally upstanding members of the law enforcement community could, in hewing to the 
company line, cross the one between upholding the law, and breaking it. These agents 
were held in thrall to the mythos of the vaunted FBI, something Bureau leadership did 
much to engender. Agents too frequently compromised their oath to uphold the 
Constitution to ideology, political expediency, or to ensure job security.  
For historians who would study the FBI, one of the most intriguing and under-
examined themes is memory, the Agency’s institutional memory. In its early history, the 
Bureau, for many complicated and exigent reasons, had to propagate a myth about itself 
in order to expand, in order to reassure the public they were trustworthy and were acting 
according to the dictates of the law. Over its nearly 100-year history, it has become adept 
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at explaining that it is an investigative agency interested only in those who violate federal 
statutes. But any objective examination of the record reveals this is just not so. The FBI is 
an intelligence agency as much as an investigative one. A huge bureaucracy has helped to 
cover the tracks, destroying documents, covering up excesses, thwarting Congressional 
investigations, and simply enough, lying. It is difficult to disagree with Richard Powers’ 
contention that the agency is ‘broken.’ Unless it is willing to confront its ghosts head-on, 
the FBI’s historical mission will remain compromised.  
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